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Abstract
Using methods of multi-state population projection, the population of China up to 2045
was studied by simultaneous interacting states of educational categories and urban/rural
residence in three alternative future paths. The results anticipate that in 2045, more than
60% of the population will have secondary education, while this was the case for only
8% of the population in1964. This study not only produces educational projections, it
also provides regular population projections by age, sex, and urban/rural place of
residence. In the coming decades, China will reach its peak in total population, working
population, and aging population in different times under low, medium and high
scenarios. According to results of this study, an important question will face Chinese
policy makers in the context of sustainable socioeconomic and environmental
development: How should the anticipated socioeconomic developments in the coming
decades be figured into the demographic trade-off between rapid fertility decline in the
near term and rapid population aging in the long term?
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1 Introduction
While demographic processes and structures rest on a biological base, changes in
fertility, mortality and migration are to a large degree socially determined. Economics,
social processes and environmental issues have far-reaching demographic
consequences, affecting population size, age structure, and family formation. Education
is of overwhelming social, economic, and cultural importance. During the process of
demographic transition, the strong negative correlation between higher education and
lower fertility is especially pronounced.
This report studies population trends and the role of present and future educational
trends in shaping the future population of China in the context of IIASA’s multi-state
demographic projection model. The development of China’s population in association
with social, economic, and environmental changes has drawn much attention from
international scholars and policy makers. In the advent of economic reform, including
educational and social welfare reform, many new trends have arisen and consequently,
the effects of the economic reform have strongly influenced demographic components
such as fertility, mortality and rural-to-urban migration.
A number of projections for China’s future population have been produced by
demographers at the UN and other international institutions, as well as in China. The
projection presented here is different from other forecasts. One very important feature
of this study is that it explicitly includes educational status of the population in its
projection. The multi-state population projection method not only considers fertility,
mortality, and migration as the driving forces of demographic change, but also assumes
education by age, sex, and region as a dimension in population projection. To our
knowledge this is the first time that the educational composition by age, sex, and region
has systematically been used for the demographic method of cohort-component
projection in China.
Another feature of this study is that it independently projects the urban and rural
population (the national population projection of China consists of aggregated results of
urban and rural projections). Demographers have devoted little attention to fertility
trends and variations in China, e.g. its localities. The urban-rural projections produced
by other institutions are based only on assumed future proportions of urban population,
which are then applied to the projected national population by age and sex. In China,
place of residence, particularly urban/rural divided, is an important issue for many
social and economic considerations, and it strongly correlates with demographic
changes (Lutz et al. 1999). Under the central planned economy, Chinese cities were
2closed off to farmers by the “invisible walls” of the household registration system (Chan
1997). Levels of socioeconomic development have differed largely between rural and
urban regions. The result of these “invisible walls” is that China has become a highly
segmented society, divided by the geographical division of urban and rural sectors. So
far, the urban household registration system, which determines where one can live and
work, has prevented a tidal wave of rural migrants, who cannot be fully absorbed in the
urban areas. Especially socioeconomic differences between rural and urban regions
have increased during the economic reform.
It is appropriate for China’s population projection to use net migration as a parameter
in the multi-state model. Since the 1980s, a large rural-to-urban migratory movement
has challenged the powerful household registration system, and brought on agricultural
and urban industrial economic reforms. Rural-to-urban migration in China has become a
hot issue for policy makers and scientists. It not only changes the economic structure
and social stability, it also strongly correlates with demographic distribution, age
structure and demographic transition. It is not an easy task to collect the date of
migration because there is no exact definition of migration, and almost every source has
different information and estimates. We have calculated and adjusted the information
and date of migration by age, sex, and education in order to meet the requirements of
the multi-state model for population projection. From this point of view, our study can
be considered as a pioneer study.
Using recently available data, we attempt to study the following questions:
1) To what extent do educational levels have an impact on future population growth?
2) Do educational differentials make a difference in projected population growth?
3) How is the age structure influenced by educational and regional differences?
4) To what extent do educational differentials affect the distribution of population in the
future?
5) What is the likely educational composition of the population in the future?
In addition to this introduction, this report consists of four sections. Section 2
describes the salient demographic features affected by rural and urban regions, as well
as by educational differentials in contemporary China. The analysis focuses on the
development of education, fertility, rural-to-urban migration, aging, and sex ratio.
Section 3 briefly describes the data and sources used, and explains the base-line input
used, such as modified fertility, estimated migration by education and age, and
estimates of the elderly population by educational categories. Nine sets of scenario
assumptions for the future course of fertility, mortality, migration and education by
rural/urban regions over the next 50 years are presented. Section 4 analyses the
projection results and shows the population size, age structure, educational composition,
rural and urban distribution of the population at both the national and rural/urban levels.
Section 5 concludes the discussion. The policy implications lay emphasis on the
obtained results of the population projection concerning shifts in Chinese family policy,
integrated policy approach, and migration policy, which may be used by planners and
policy makers for sustainable development planning in China.
32 Salient Demographic Features in Contemporary China
China is the most advanced developing country in the population transition process,
where fertility rates declined from 4.2 births per woman in 1974 to below replacement
level, 1.85, in 1995. The factors fostering the fertility transition in China have been
attributed to the government’s population policies and family planning programs. On
the other hand, a broad spectrum of causes is related to socioeconomic development
beyond the government’s population policies and family planning programs. The
fertility transition has been recently influenced by the rapid socioeconomic changes
resulting from the new economic reform. In urban regions, the economic reform may
have increased the potential benefits of having fewer children in families. In rural areas,
however, the substitution of the household responsibility system of production for the
commune system has increased productivity and household income, but has weakened
the government’s ability to regulate fertility.
It is interesting to ask why fertility patterns and trends differ in urban and rural China
in spite of a uniform intensification of population policies throughout the nation. These
differences have resulted from differences in socioeconomic conditions. It seems likely
that most of the factors tend to facilitate the government’s effort to make information,
supplies, and services accessible to the urban population (Cheng and Maxim 1992).
Among the socioeconomic factors, education is an actual or potential determinant of
fertility reduction. Studies have shown that education affects several aspects of fertility
in China. First, educational development has had a substantial effect on the age at which
women marry because they stay in school longer and because education widens their
employment opportunities in the labor market. Second, higher educational levels have
substantially raised the investment costs of children, especially for parents who wish to
ensure good career prospects for their children. Finally, education promotes a rational
view of family formation and the acceptance of contraception for either spacing or
limiting the number of children.
In the following, we briefly view educational changes in China over the past decades,
and address fertility, migration, aging, and sex ratio by comparing rural and urban
regions.
2.1 Development of education
Education begins with kindergarten (ages 3-6) and continues with primary (ages 6-12)
and secondary (ages 12-18), which includes junior and senior secondary schools,
specialized secondary schools, vocational secondary schools, and technical training
schools. Higher education, which includes universities and colleges as well as college
for postgraduates, requires 4-5 years for a B.A. degree, 7-8 years for a Masters degree,
and 10-11 years for a Ph.D.
In China, education is considered to be “a project of vital and lasting importance,
calling for a good educational foundation” (People’s Daily, May 15, 1987). For decades
the educational policy has been to “enable everyone who receives an education to
develop morally, intellectually and physically” (Liu 1989). One of the most remarkable
changes seen in China today is in education at all levels (see Table 1). The percentage
of no schooling has declined from 51.8% in 1964 to 16% in 1995. The most profound
change is at the middle school level, where attendance has risen from only 8.32% in
1964 to 39.29% in 1995 – almost 5 times as many as in 1964.
4Table 1. Population, aged 6 and over, by educational level in 1964, 1982, 1990, and
1995. Based on State Statistical Bureau (1986b, 1993a, 1998); Population Institute
(1985); Office of Population Survey (1997); Yao and Hua (1995).
1964 1982 1990 1995
(in millions) % (in millions) % (in millions) % (in millions) %
No schoolinga,b 258.05 51.80 283.68 31.88 182.25 18.77 179.38 16.02
Primary school 192.00 39.30 355.35 39.94 420.21 43.25 475.26 42.45
Middle school 41.46 8.32 244.73 27.50 353.27 36.36 439.97 39.29
College and above 2.88 0.58 6.04 0.68 15.76 1.62 25.06 2.24
Total 494.39 889.80 971.49 1119.67
a
 No schooling includes the illiterate and semi-literate.
b
 No schooling in 1990 covers only population aged 15 and over.
The educational system in China is under the authority and guidance of the Ministry
of Education of the central government. At the provincial level, education is
administered by the educational bureau of the provincial government. For more than
four decades, government expenditure on education has increased significantly. In 1953,
the percentage of the educational share of the total government expenditure was 8.8%;
in 1994 it had increased to 16.91% (State Statistical Bureau 1995). Associated with the
economic reform in the mid-1980s, the central government advocated parts of the
university to be financed by various institutions under the supervision of the Ministry of
Education or the authority of education at the provincial level. The objective of this
policy is to expand higher education to suit the needs of economic development. The
government policies have focused on two aspects concerning the increased fundamental
education of the population.
2.1.1 Eradicating illiteracy and popularizing nine years of educating the
population
In the 1950s, there was a widespread movement to eradicate illiteracy in order to raise
the listening and writing abilities of Chinese citizens. Around 70% of the total
population were without formal schooling after World War II (1937-1945) and the civil
war (1945-1949). In the 1960s, the implementation of an obligatory nine-year education
policy began. This policy called for six years in primary school and three years in junior
secondary school. The realization of this policy has been consistent in urban regions.
However, in rural regions, it did not develop in the planned way in terms of financial
assistance. Eventually, in 1986, the State Council set up and issued a “law of obligatory
nine-year education of citizens” in order to meet the Chinese “four modernizations”
(industry, agriculture, science and technology). Under this law, all persons are obliged
to complete nine years of education, and the authorities at all levels must make this
possible for everyone voluntarily. Since then, concrete action supporting nine years of
education was taken everywhere in the rural regions. As a result, China has reached near
universal enrolment in primary school-age children, and has rapidly increased the
number of students in secondary schools. In 1997, the percentage of children enrolled in
primary schools was 98.9%, while in 1952 it was only 49.2%. The percentage of
graduates of primary school entering junior secondary school was 44.2% in 1957, and
increased to 93.7% in 1997 (State Statistical Bureau 1998). However, it is necessary to
5mention that in spite of the rapid expansion in education, illiteracy in rural China is still
high.
2.1.2 Encouraging and improving women in education
When observing the changes in education, one of the most crucial phenomena to be
considered is the participation of women in education. An important aspect of the state
policies has always been to encourage women to enroll in schools at various levels. In
China, a woman’s education is one of the important indicators of a woman’s social
status, because a woman’s employment and domestic status prospects depend heavily
on the training and educational schemes through which she can acquire the relevant
skills. The Chinese government has made deliberate efforts to improve women’s status
by ensuring equal opportunities in education. Therefore, the past four decades have
witnessed a remarkable improvement in female education, which is not only a
manifestation of the general improvement in the standing of females, but also an
indication of the universal increase in female opportunities to receive education.
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
19
49
19
51
19
53
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
year
pe
rc
en
t
college and above middle school primary school
Figure 1. Development of women’s education. Data for the years 1966-1972 and 1989
are not available. Data from China All Women’s Federation (1991); Chinese Ministry
of Education (1984, 1998); State Statistical Bureau (1993b, 1996, 1998).
Figure 1 and Table 2 show a dramatic rise and changes in the proportion of women’s
share of total students at all levels of education. In 1997, among all students, 37.32%
were women in higher education, 45.46% in middle schools, and 47.63% in primary
schools. In 1952, only 23.39% were women in universities, 23.50% in middle schools,
and 32.9% in primary schools. This indicates a decline in the gender gap in education.
Of course, this by no means excludes gender differences in education. In fact, when
6comparing the proportion of females enrolled with those of males, gender differences in
all levels of education still exist, especially in rural China.
Table 2. Percentage of women of total students at stated educational level, 1949-1997.
Data for the years 1966-1972 and 1989 are not available. Data from China All Women’s
Federation (1991); Chinese Ministry of Education (1984, 1998); State Statistical Bureau
(1993b, 1996, 1998).
Year
College
and
above
Middle
school
Primary
school Year
College
and
above
Middle
school
Primary
school
1949 19.77 1974 33.76 38.10 43.70
1950 21.20 26.50 1975 32.59 39.30 45.20
1951 22.53 25.60 28.00 1976 33.02 40.10 45.50
1952 23.39 23.50 32.90 1977 29.04 41.70 45.40
1953 25.28 24.40 35.50 1978 24.11 41.50 44.90
1954 26.27 25.00 33.30 1979 24.09 40.80 44.90
1955 25.90 26.90 33.40 1980 23.44 39.60 44.60
1956 24.60 29.30 35.20 1981 24.42 39.00 44.00
1957 23.25 30.80 34.50 1982 26.50 39.30
1958 23.30 31.30 38.50 1983 26.90 39.50
1959 22.58 31.20 39.10 1984 28.60 40.00
1960 24.50 31.20 39.10 1985 30.00 40.20 44.80
1961 24.65 32.20 27.50 1986 25.50 40.70
1962 25.34 34.10 34.80 1987 33.00 40.80
1963 25.84 34.00 1988 33.40
1964 25.73 34.10 35.00 1989
1965 26.88 32.20 1990 33.70 41.90 46.20
1966 1991 33.40 42.70 46.50
1967 1992 33.70 43.10 46.60
1968 1993 33.60 43.70 46.80
1969 1994 34.50 44.30 47.10
1970 1995 35.40 44.80 47.30
1971 1996 36.40 45.30 47.50
1972 1997 37.32 45.46 47.63
1973 30.77 33.00 40.70
Another important aspect of education in China is that it is regionally unbalanced;
particularly, the disparities are very large between rural and urban regions. On the one
hand, the development of education is unequal, because “the primary functional sub-
systems of a society, the economic, the polity, the integrative sub-system, and latent
pattern-maintenance sub-system, each constitutes part of the situation for each of the
other” (Parsons and Smelser 1964:51). On the other hand, education is an important
active participant in the socioeconomic process. Therefore, educational systems have
differential impacts on various aspects of development and social change.
The educational distributions by age and rural/urban regions, calculated from the
National 1% Population Sample Survey 1995 (Office of Population Survey 1997) show
7that there are great disparities between rural and urban China (see population pyramids
below).
Generally, the educational success in both rural and urban China is likely to continue
as young generations move up the age pyramid. But the level of education at all degrees
is much higher for the urban than for the rural population. Obviously, there was a much
larger proportion of the urban population in the middle school level in each age group.
Also, the rural/urban disparities by gender are pronounced. The rural population with
low educational levels has the highest gender difference. The level of no schooling
among ages 15 and above was higher for females than for males. Intake in middle
schools for females aged 30 and above was about half that of males. Observations from
the rural and urban pyramids indicate that rural males and females should be targeted
for educational and development services. Furthermore, cultural barriers to women’s
education in rural China have to be ameliorated somewhat through programs
specifically addressed in this issue.
82.2 Fertility differentials by rural and urban region
The differences in total fertility rate (TFR) between urban and rural populations over the
past decades can be seen in Figure 2. Urban fertility rates were even lower during the
early 1950s, before the government initiated birth control policies. The government’s
first family planning campaign took place in the mid-1950s, when the government
began to manufacture contraceptives and relax restrictions on induced abortion. The
urban fertility transition began as early as 1954, when the TFR was 5.72. It then fell to
5.67 in 1955, to 5.33 in 1956, and to 5.25 in 1958. Urban TFR was very low (2.98) in
1961, at half of the 1957 level, as a consequence of starvation between 1959-1961.
Urban fertility as a proportion of rural fertility dropped greatly in the 1960s: from 76%
in 1962 to 53% in 1969. This disparity demonstrates the relatively early timing of the
urban fertility transition. In 1963 the baby boom took place. Since then, urban China has
experienced unprecedented fertility declines. By the middle of the 1970s, the urban
fertility rate had already reached the replacement level. By this time, the government
had given full attention to and taken concrete action for family planning by encouraging
late marriages and fewer births. The rapid urban fertility decline during the 1970s
coincided not only with the intensification of the family planning program, but also with
the development of education and other socioeconomic factors and processes.
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Figure 2. Differences in TFR between urban and rural populations, 1950-1995. Data
based on: for 1950-1979, State Family Planning Commission (1982); for 1980-1988,
State Family Planning Commission (1988); for 1989 and 1990, State Statistical Bureau
(1993a); for 1991 and 1992, State Family Planning Commission (1992); for 1995,
Office of Population Survey (1997).
Fertility changes in China have been categorized as “induced” and “natural” (Wang
1991). The former reflects government intervention hastening fertility decline; the latter
reflects a fertility transition accompanied by socioeconomic development, such as
increased family income, improvement of education, and promotion of social welfare
services. Experiences of rural fertility transition have been considered as an induced
decline. In contrast with urban fertility declines, in 1961 the rural fertility rate fell to
3.35 due to starvation. By 1962 the rural fertility rate was 6.30; this was not the case in
urban regions until 1963. Between 1963-1970, a big baby boom took place. The rural
population began its fertility transition at a rate of 7.03 in 1968, then fell to 6.26 in
1969, to 6.38 in 1970. The TFR in rural China has rapidly declined since full-scale
implementation of family planning policies began throughout China in 1971. Although
the specific requirements of greater population control were not strictly adhered to
during the 1970s, the TFR fell from 6.01 in 1971 to 3.05 in 1979. Eventually, the TFR
of rural China dropped to 2.48 in 1981 when the State Council put forward the strict
family policy: only one child per couple. By 1995, the TFR of rural China reached 2.0.
Fertility change in rural China has indicated that successful implementation of the birth
planning program has played an important role in contributing to lower levels of rural
fertility.
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2.3 Fertility differentials by educational level
Over the years, various associations have been examined between education and fertility
in underlying policy issues, theory, methodology, and empirical evidence. Empirical
studies around the world show negative statistical associations between education and
fertility in demographic change. Cochrane (1979, quoted in Eloundou-Enyegue
1999:289) says: “education does not affect fertility directly, but acts through many
variables such as the biological supply of children, the demand for children by husbands
and wives, and the regulation of fertility.” Moreover, some researchers have extended
the analysis to examine the specific benefits responsible for the effects of schooling on
fertility.
Here, rather than to theoretically and methodologically discuss the effects of
education on fertility, we empirically look at more insights of education-fertility
interactions based on the 1990 population census (State Statistical Bureau 1993a).
Table 3. Age-specific fertility rates (per 1,000) for females by educational level,
rural/urban regions, and for all of China in 1990. Calculations based on State Statistical
Bureau (1993a).
Age group Total No schooling Primary school Middle school College and above
Rural
TFR 2.58 3.00 2.59 2.43 1.59
15-19 25.92 50.43 30.61 14.50 1.11
20-24 218.69 255.42 227.03 199.71 73.77
25-29 173.06 186.25 172.48 168.74 179.17
30-34 65.68 68.54 60.33 72.57 41.69
35-39 23.17 27.29 19.99 24.92 18.81
40-44 7.04 9.46 5.59 5.01 3.65
45-49 2.01 2.24 1.78 1.54 0.53
Urban
TFR 1.59 2.55 2.08 1.48 1.31
15-19 10.14 48.00 28.21 6.59 0.14
20-24 143.08 232.45 196.98 139.64 44.36
25-29 117.72 152.42 132.05 110.30 170.20
30-34 34.16 54.47 44.59 28.86 34.30
35-39 10.67 17.36 11.36 8.90 10.03
40-44 2.10 4.44 2.08 1.43 1.70
45-49 0.71 1.15 0.68 0.53 0.34
All China
TFR 2.29 2.96 2.52 1.99 1.32
15-19 21.99 50.30 30.40 11.39 0.18
20-24 198.81 253.96 223.93 176.21 46.88
25-29 155.55 183.37 167.37 142.65 170.66
30-34 55.74 67.04 57.68 48.24 34.58
35-39 19.56 26.16 18.25 14.87 10.37
40-44 5.67 8.88 4.79 2.81 1.77
45-49 1.63 2.09 1.46 0.89 0.35
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As can be seen in Table 3, fertility has declined as a result of better education. In
each age group there is an inverse relationship between age-specific fertility and
educational levels. A higher educational level is associated with lower TFR. In China as
a whole, the most dramatic change in fertility has occurred among women with middle
school and college education. The TFR of women with no schooling is more than twice
that of women with college education, and 1.5 times higher than those with middle
school education. Thus, education appears to be an active factor influencing fertility rate
beyond the national family planning guidelines.
The Chinese experience has shown that education affects women’s fertility through
the path of delaying marriage and thereby delaying a woman’s entrance into her
reproductive life. The age at first marriage is highly and positively correlated to
education. According to the women’s marriage survey in 1987 (Sha 1994:72), the
average age at first marriage was 25.89 for college level, 23.05 for middle school, 21.08
for primary school, and 20.14 for women with no schooling. Women with a middle
school or higher education are more likely to marry later, and hence give birth to fewer
children than their less educated counterparts. Thus, the educated women use their
human capital resources in the labor market while they reduce their time allocation for
familial roles such as bearing and rearing children.
Furthermore, when comparing the fertility rates of urban and rural women at all
educational levels, women in rural areas have a higher fertility rate than their city-
dwelling counterparts. The rural-urban fertility differentials at the same educational
level suggest that the fertility decline is a result of multiple interactions of socio-
economic factors, not only of education alone.
2.4 Son preference and the unusually high sex ratio of infants
China has had a traditional culture of male preference for thousands of years. Males
play the major role in carrying on the family line, labor participation and old-age
security, therefore, parents tend to value sons over daughters. Although this traditional
culture has been gradually weakening with the social changes in China, since the 1980s,
the sex ratio of males to females at birth has been increasing steadily. Some people still
wish to have at least one son in their small families, therefore, fertility behavior is
different for women with and without sons. Son-preference is common in many parts of
China, especially in rural areas, where the levels of socioeconomic development are
relatively low. The effects of sex preference on fertility behavior are reflected in the
selection of the sex of children through medical technologies.
Since the 1980s, the sex ratio at birth has been rising steadily (see Table 4). In China
as a whole, the sex ratio rose from 107.63 in 1982 (the third census) to 111.75 in 1990
(the fourth census). In 1995, the high sex ratio of infants became more serious: it was as
high as 116.57, and increased by 4.82 compared to 111.75 in 1990. The unusual high
sex ratio of infants in recent years has attracted much attention from demographers and
the government departments concerned.
As an explanation to the high infant sex ratio in China – although there is no
common conclusion – the more concentrated suggestions are: 1) sex selection through
medical technologies (selective abortion before the birth); and 2) under-reporting of
female births or false reporting of early deaths of girls as stillborns. Some demographers
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believe that selective abortion before birth and under-reporting on female infants may
be the main reasons.
Chinese demographers have found that there is a strong relationship between the sex
ratio of infants and the sex composition of children (Hao 1997). A woman, whose first
child is a boy, is more likely to want a one-child certificate than a woman, whose first
child is a girl; at all parities, women with few or no sons are less likely to be using
contraceptives than those with many sons. Also, the probability of having a second birth
for women with one daughter is higher than for those with one son; and the probability
of a third birth for women with two daughters is significantly higher than for those with
one son and one daughter. Moreover, as Table 4 indicates, place of residence also
affects the infant sex ratio; the rural infant sex ratio is higher than the urban one.
However, there are further questions ahead for Chinese demographers: How does the
son-preference influence the fertility behavior of the population in general? How large
has the influence been? Will the son-preference hamper further fertility decline?
Table 4. The sex ratio of infants. Calculations based on Office of Population Survey
(1997); Office of Census (1991); Population Institute (1985); State Statistical Bureau
(1986a, 1986b, 1993a, 1996); Yao (1995).
Year Male Female Sex Ratio
All China
1953 9,716,971 9,264,877 104.88
1964 14,509,500 13,974,327 103.83
1982 10,787,028 10,022,319 107.63
1990 12,254,905 10,965,946 111.75
1995 9,274,600 7,956,200 116.57
Rural
1990 9,846,920 8,787,090 112.06
1995 7,018,600 5,960,700 117.75
Towna
1990 731,060 649,130 112.62
1995 707,500 612,000 115.60
Citya
1990 1,701,050 1,558,370 109.16
1995 1,548,400 1,383,600 111.91
a
 See Section 3.1.1 for definition of town and city.
2.5 Fast growing rural-to-urban migration
Since the mid-1980s, rural-to-urban migration has been an important factor in
demographic change. One of the major consequences of the economic reforms in China
has been a rise in population mobility. Rural-to-urban migration is a dynamic force in
the transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy.
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Although there are numerous methodological problems in the classification of rural
migration, generally, the so-called floating rural laborers, who are moving across
provinces, are estimated at around 56 million (Jia and Meng 1996). Of these, 70%-80%
are working in cities and other urban areas (Cai 1995). Thus, rural migrant labor is
estimated at approximately 45 million. Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong each host
about 10 million migrants (Yang 1997).
There are deep socioeconomic reasons for the fast growing rural-to-urban migration.
The quantities of rural-to-urban migration are largely determined by continuing
population growth; dramatic changes in the structure of agricultural production; a
rapidly growing urban economy and agglomerates; implementation of the family
responsibility system and a dual household registration system.
Prior to 1978, the distribution of the population resulted from the implementation of
a traditional economic development strategy, which placed its first priority on heavy
industry. This strategy created barriers for migration in two ways. 1) Industrial growth
by heavy industry created few employment opportunities to absorb surplus rural
laborers. 2) A planned labor force allocation had made interregional and inter-sectoral
migration impossible. In addition, a household registration (“hukou“) system was
introduced to prevent rural laborers from moving into cities. The hukou system is
analogous to an internal passport system, or at least to a “green card” system. This
system created different opportunities and constraints for holders of the urban hukou or
rural hukou status. Under such a system, the rural population could not change their
residential status and occupational identity as they liked. As a result, despite the change
of composition in national output value when agricultural production dropped from
57.7% in 1952 to 32.8% in 1978, employment structure did not change accordingly. The
agricultural labor force only decreased from 83.5% in 1952 to 70.5% in 1978.
Corresponding to this was a rise in the urbanization level: 17.9% in 1978 versus 12.5%
in 1952. Since migration was strictly controlled, it was difficult for farmers to change
their jobs and residential status. Hence, a large amount of surplus labor accumulated in
the rural areas, associated with the technological development of agriculture. China now
faces stronger pressure for rural labor force transference and land annexation.
According to estimates by the Population Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, the proportion of rural labor surplus of total rural labor is 31.53% for all of
China (Cai 1995). Because the differences between provinces is very substantial, the
direction of migration and of the labor movement appears to be from central and west to
east, and from rural to urban areas.
With the transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy, the household
registration system in urban China tends to be a dual-track system, the so-called
“planned” track and “outside-of-planned” track. In the planned track, rural-to-urban
migration is still constrained by a highly controlled household registration system. Only
hukou migration (i.e. migration with permanent residency rights) is considered as
planned migration. The scale of migration through the changing of permanent residence
has not advanced enough to correct the distorted population distribution, so that
migration “without plan” has become a necessity. Migration without residency rights,
the so-called “floating” population, is outside of the state plans. They are not supposed
to stay in the destination permanently. However, a large outside-of-planned track
migration actually plays a substantial role in the urban economy and the urbanization
process. They demand low-wage rural labor in China’s urban areas. Many construction
companies already hire their unskilled workers directly from rural areas. The booming
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towns and cities also offer numerous opportunities for rural laborers to start a small
private business.
It is necessary to address three points. 1) A large rural-to-urban migration outside of
the state plans is often not reflected in the official statistics. 2) Most migrants come
from the floating population; at a low degree they are expected to become permanent
citizens. Their place of destination is not fixed, and their duration of stay is temporary.
3) The duality of migration is an outcome of the different levels of socioeconomic
development in cities and in the countryside, including labor market segmentation based
on the hukou system. These points are preconditions to understanding Chinese rural-to-
urban migration.
2.6 Fast population aging
Chinese population aging appeared in the population age distribution in the mid-1970s.
Since the 1980s it has steadily increased along with the significant fertility decline and a
stable increase in life expectancy. In the 1990s it has become more serious (see Table
5).
Table 5. Age distribution (in %) of the total population by rural, urban, and all China,
1953-1995. Data based on: for 1953-1982, Institute of Population (1985); for 1990,
Office of Census (1991); for 1995, Office of Population Survey (1997).
Age group 1953 1964 1982 1990 1995
All China
0-14 36.28 40.69 33.59 27.62 26.73
15-19 56.40 53.18 58.77 63.81 63.10
60 and over 7.32 6.13 7.64 8.57 10.17
Median age 22.70 20.20 22.90 25.30 27.70
Rural
0-14 35.40 29.59 28.72
15-19 56.80 61.69 61.29
60 and over 7.80 8.72 9.99
Towna
0-14 28.31 23.70 23.50
15-19 65.29 69.10 66.95
60 and over 6.40 7.20 9.54
Citya
0-14 26.00 21.88 21.09
15-19 66.60 69.50 67.90
60 and over 7.40 8.62 11.01
a
 See Section 3.1.1 for definition of town and city.
Between 1964-1995, the median age declined by 7.5 years. The proportion age 60
and older increased by 2.4% from 1982 to 1990, and reached 10.7% in 1995. The
proportion age 0-4 decreased by 7.1% between 1964 and 1982, and by 6.86% from
1982 to 1995. It is obvious that the speed of population aging has become quicker since
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the 1980s. In the geographical aspect, the speed of population aging in cities is faster
than in the country. From 1982 to 1995, the proportion age 60 and older in cities
increased by 3.61%, whereas in rural areas it rose by 2.19%.
Population aging is a global phenomenon. However, when comparing the more
developed countries (MDC) with the less developed countries (LDC), the type of aging
is different, when the entire age distribution is considered. “MDCs are ‘aging from the
middle,’ whereas LDCs are ‘aging from the bottom.’… In MDCs, aging is reducing the
size of the labor force, as the proportion of 15-59 year olds in the population declines. In
LDCs, aging is increasing the size of the labor force: the proportion in the middle age
group remains constant and population is redistributed, ... from the under-15 group,
where labor force participation is very low, to the over-60 age group, where labor force
participation is substantial, especially in low-income countries” (MacKellar 1997:5).
When we consider the size of the labor force, Chinese population aging fits the LDC
pattern. Since the 1960s, the size of the labor force in China has maintained a stable and
sustained development: it reached 590 million in 1982, and increased to 723 million in
1990, then rose to 760 million in 1995. Currently, China is in the golden period of labor
resource.
The aging of the Chinese population has developed its own characteristics when
compared to other LDCs as well as to MDCs. Aging in China started late and developed
fast. It usually takes 50-100 years for industrialized countries to change from a country
with a young population to a country with an aged population. But in China, this
process took only 30 years. The population aging of MDCs developed gradually
following high economic development, while in China aging occurred during a period
of low economic development. China now has the largest aged population in the world,
and must deal with the social security issues of an aged population. Although at present,
the proportion of the aged population and the old-age dependency ratio in China are
more favorable than in the MDCs, they will deteriorate rapidly and soon surpass the
levels of western industrialized countries, as well as the former socialist countries of
central and eastern Europe, causing similar problems. And with a much lower level of
income in China, the solution of the problem becomes even more difficult.
3 Base Data and Scenario Assumption for the Next 50 Years
The tools of a multi-state population projection allow the projection of a population by
several characteristics, such as age, sex, education and place of residence. In particular,
educational levels have been introduced into the model as one of the assumed main
sources of population heterogeneity. Thus, specific sets of assumptions are applied to
educational groups linked with fertility, mortality and migration patterns.
3.1 Base data
As required by the multi-state population projection by educational level, the base data
is divided into age, sex, educational level, rural and urban region. The base data for the
Chinese projection is derived from four major sources:
1) National 1% Population Sample Survey 1995 (Office of Population Survey 1997),
conducted by the State Statistical Bureau of China. This large-scale survey on
national strength and condition after the 1990 population census, provided a reliable
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basis for the data of the starting year: population by age, sex, educational level, as
well as by rural and urban region, fertility and mortality by age and region, registered
rural-to-urban migration.
2) National Population Census 1990 (State Statistical Bureau 1993a) served as a
reference for estimating the fertility rate by education and by rural/urban region for
women aged 15-49.
3) Survey Data on the Chinese Support System for the Elderly (National Research
Center on Aging 1992) allowed us to construct the population aged 60-80 by
educational level.
4) Sampling Survey, Data on Chinese Migration in 74 Cities and Towns in 1986
(Institute of Population Studies 1988). This was a key project of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences and the P50 Program of the United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA, New York). It provided detailed information about educational levels
of migrants by sex and age. It is available to estimate the educational structure of
migration.
In the National 1% Population Sample Survey 1995 (Office of Population Survey
1997), the data on urban and rural population, levels of education, and migration are
based on the following concepts.
3.1.1 Urban and rural population
Urban population includes all people living in cities and towns with permanent
residency rights. City population refers to people with permanent residency rights
living in the districts of cities that are sub-divided into districts, or living in the street
communities of cities that are not sub-divided into districts. Town population refers to
people with permanent residency rights living in neighborhood communities under the
jurisdiction of cities that are not sub-divided into districts, or living in neighborhood
communities of towns directly under country jurisdiction. Rural population refers to
all people not living in cities and towns, who are without permanent residency rights of
a city or town, and are living in rural areas.
3.1.2 Concept of level of education
No schooling refers to those who are illiterate or semi-literate. Primary school refers to
those who have completed the final grade at the first level of education. Normally, this
takes six years in China. Middle school refers to those who have completed the final
grade at a senior secondary school and a junior secondary school, or a vocational
secondary school, or a technical training school. College and above refers to those who
have completed the final degree at a university or college, as well as a college for post-
graduates, including universities and colleges for adults.
3.1.3 Concept of migration
Migration refers to those who have left a rural region, where they were registered as
residents, and have lived or worked continuously for more than one-half year in cities or
towns without permanent residency rights of the city or town, but have been registered
as temporary residents.
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3.2 A brief explanation of the base-line input data
3.2.1 Modified fertility in 1995
The TFR calculated directly according to the 1% survey in 1995 was 1.46 (Office of
Population Survey 1997). Does such a low figure reflect the current level of fertility in
China? The TFR in 1989 was 2.25, according to China’s 1990 population census (State
Statistical Bureau 1993a). In 1991 it was 1.65, according to the sample survey of
380,000 people conducted by the Family Planning Committee (1991). The adjusted
TFR was 2.20 (Zeng 1996). The State Statistical Bureau (SSB) obviously believed that
the TFR is lower (1.46). The main reason for such low fertility was the under-reporting
of the data on births and fertility. This has happened in different population sample
surveys in recent years (Zhang et al. 1997). To make an accurate evaluation of China’s
fertility level in the mid-1990s, the SSB adjusted the TFR of 1995. The adjustment was
based on the total birth rate of the 1995 survey (Office of Population Survey 1997),
which was 17.12 per thousand. This figure was obtained by adjusting sample errors and
enumeration errors, and reflected more accurately the actual status of births. According
to this figure, the adjusted TFR of 1995 was 1.85 for the whole country. According to
the proportional relationship between the surveyed TFR of all China, and the TFR of
cities, towns, and rural areas, the adjustment on the TFR for cities was 1.43, for towns
1.58, and for rural areas 2.
The base-year fertility data by education used in the multi-state projection was
estimated in three steps. First, in light of the adjustment on TFR by the SSB in 1995, we
adjusted the age-specific fertility rate (see Table 6a). Second, we estimated the fertility
differentials by education, based on the fertility level of all educational categories,
according to the 1990 population census (see Table 6b). Finally, we calculated the age-
specific fertility rate by education according to the results of the first and second steps.
Table 6a. Estimated TFR by region in 1995, as adjusted by the State Statistical Bureau
(Department of Population and Employment). Source: Zhang et al. (1997).
Region TFR Modified TFR Differential TFR
All China 1.46 1.85 0.39
City 1.13 1.43 0.30
Town 1.25 1.58 0.33
Rural 1.58 2.00 0.42
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Table 6b. Estimated age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) and TFR by region in 1995.
Calculations are based on Office of Population Survey (1997).
Age group ASFR and TFR Ratio ASFR/TFR Estimated ASFR and TFR
Rural
15-19 0.07 0.04 0.08
20-24 0.85 0.54 1.08
25-29 0.47 0.30 0.60
30-34 0.15 0.09 0.19
35-39 0.03 0.02 0.04
40-44 0.01 0.01 0.01
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.01
Total 1.58 1.00 2.00
Town
15-19 0.03 0.02 0.04
20-24 0.66 0.53 0.84
25-29 0.43 0.34 0.54
30-34 0.10 0.08 0.13
35-39 0.02 0.02 0.03
40-44 0.01 0.00 0.01
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1.25 1.00 1.58
City
15-19 0.02 0.02 0.03
20-24 0.54 0.49 0.70
25-29 0.43 0.39 0.56
30-34 0.10 0.09 0.13
35-39 0.02 0.02 0.02
40-44 0.00 0.00 0.00
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1.13 1.00 1.43
All China
15-19 0.05 0.04 0.07
20-24 0.77 0.53 0.98
25-29 0.46 0.32 0.58
30-34 0.13 0.09 0.17
35-39 0.03 0.02 0.04
40-44 0.01 0.01 0.01
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1.46 1.00 1.85
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3.2.2 The age group 5-9 in 1995
Through the population pyramid below, we can see that the size of the cohort aged 5-9
is much larger than either the 10-14 or 0-4 group. There are two basic causes for this.
First, the “echo effect” of the baby boom from 1963 to the early 1970s. The age 5-9
cohort was born between 1985 and 1990; they are children of the large baby boom
generation. In 1983, more than 29 million young Chinese born during the baby boom
would marry and have their children. This baby boom created great pressure on Chinese
population control in terms of first marriage and births in most of the 1980s. Second, the
effect of the New Marriage Law in 1981, which lowered the legal age of marriage from
23 to 20 (for women). Accordingly, the mean age at first marriage has declined, and a
dramatic increase in the number of married people was expected as the baby boom
generation reached the legal age of marriage. For example, 18% of the women were
married by age 23 or younger in 1980. This increased to 30.8% in 1982, and to 28.3% in
1983. The impact of the fluctuation resulting from the change of the legal marriage age
has been gradually eliminated since the late 1980s.
Source: Office of Population Survey (1997)
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3.2.3 Estimated rural-to-urban migration by education and age
Analyzing data for rural-to-urban migration is not an easy task. There is no exact
definition for rural-to-urban migration in different estimates. The data of total net
migration has been calculated according to the 1% population survey in 1995 (Office of
Population Survey 1997). However, because of a lack of accurate data on rural to urban
by level of education, the age, sex and educational structures have been estimated, based
on the survey data of the Institute of Population Studies (1988) since it provides the
educational level of migration for males and females, as well as for age groups.
3.2.4 Estimated population age 60 and above by education
Survey data on the Chinese support system for the elderly (National Research Center on
Aging 1992) gives the proportion of the population in each educational category for
ages 60-100. The proportion of each educational level is applied to the same age group
in 1995 for the projection.
3.2.5 Data on mortality not estimated by education
Unfortunately, due to a lack of accurate data on mortality by level of education, the
same base-year data on mortality levels is used for all educational levels in the multi-
state projection.
3.3 Sets of scenario assumptions for future projection
The usual way to produce scenario assumptions, which combine the alternative three
basic demographic components fertility, mortality and migration, is to operate through
one of these three factors. In our multi-state population projection, education combines
with fertility, mortality and migration in a scenario approach. Also, the place of
residence (rural or urban) is considered as a variant.
The scenarios for education are obtained from that principle. Fertility is low among
women with higher education, in a period when educational levels are increasing.
Women with higher education tend to take the lead in reducing their fertility, and a
fertility gap appears (Yousif et al. 1996). The weight of each educational category is
hypothesized to change by increasing the educational transition rate among different
educational levels, which link with the low, central and high demographic assumptions,
so that the impact of education on future population size and population structure will
be tested.
The following scenario matrix (Table 7) and tables of summarized assumptions
(Tables 8-14) present nine sets of scenarios for rural and urban Chinese population
projection over 50 years. The national population projection is aggregated from the
results of the rural and urban projections. Each scenario combines low, central, and high
assumptions on fertility, mortality, migration, and education. Each scenario assumption
(low, central, and high) combines with another three scenarios: no convergence,
education converged, education and region converged. The base year parameters of
each area remain the same in all nine scenarios.
The low scenario implies that fertility and mortality will decline with the increase in
higher education by the end of the projection period. The TFR is expected to continue to
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drop to 1.7 in rural areas, 1.29 in urban regions, 1.56 at the national level. The
assumptions of low mortality, which lead to an increase in life expectancy at birth,
range between 1.79 to 2.10 years (per decade) for rural men and women, and at about
1.65 years for both sexes in urban China. Consistent with declining fertility and
mortality rates, we assume that the highest transition rates achieved by the end of the
projection period in rural regions will be 100 for males and females with no schooling
to primary school. For those with primary to middle school education, they will be 90
for males and 85 for females. Those with middle school to college and above levels,
they will be between 8 to 10. These assumptions show that the middle school level is
rising quickly in rural areas. For urban regions, the highest transition rates are 100 from
primary to middle school, and 35 from middle school to college level and above for
both males and females. In both rural and urban regions, we assume that there are no
illiterate or semi-literate. The scenario of net rural-to-urban migration is expected to
increase at a very low level, since it is still under the strict control of the urban
household registration system.
In the central scenario, fertility by different educational category will remain
constant until the end of the projection period, at the same level as the base year 1995 in
rural and urban regions. At the national level, TFR is aggregated to be between 1.75 and
1.86. In rural China, life expectancy will increase by 6.73 years for men and 6.74 years
for women by the end of the projection period. A moderate rise in net migration is
expected. The transition rates for men in rural China are at the same level as the low
scenario assumption for no schooling to primary and primary to middle school. The
transition rate for middle school to college and above is assumed lower than in the low
scenario. For rural females, the transition rates are lower than for males for middle
school and college and above, i.e., 75 for primary to middle school, 4 for middle school
to college and above. For urban China, we assume that the gender gap disappears in all
levels, and that the transition rates are the same as in the low educational scenario,
except for transition rates for middle school to college and above, which are lower than
in the low educational scenario.
The high scenario considers high assumptions for fertility, mortality and net
migration, and low assumptions for education. We assume that TFR will increase to
slightly over replacement level, between 2.12 to 2.32 (aggregated) at the national level.
The high scenario for fertility assumes that the policy of family planning will be more
relaxed, especially to a great extent in cities. Under the assumption of slow-declining
mortality, the life expectancy rises 1.6 years for men and 1.84 years for women per
decade in rural regions, and 1.35 years for both males and females in urban regions.
With the high assumption for migration, we expect that total net migration will be
largely expanded under a gradual relaxation of the urban household registration system.
The low education hypothesizes that there are no improvements in various levels of
education, and educational levels remain constant as of the starting year 1995.
No convergence refers to fertility differentials by educational levels, and by
rural/urban residency which is held constant at the base year 1995.
Education converged means that the fertility differentials by education will decline;
a convergence of fertility levels across educational categories takes place, but the
distinction of fertility between rural and urban is not declining.
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Education and region converged implies a convergence of fertility levels in
educational categories and in rural/urban regions; fertility differentials by education and
rural/urban residency are declining.
Table 7. Scenario matrix.
Low Scenarioa Central Scenariob High Scenarioc
No convergence L1 C1 H1
Education converged L2 C2 H2
Education and region
converged
L3 C3 H3
a
 Low fertility, low mortality, high education, low migration
b
 Central, fertility, central mortality, central education, central migration
c
 High fertility, high mortality, low education, high migration
Table 8. Base year parameters and low scenario assumptions for rural China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Scenario L1 Scenario L2 Scenario L3
TFR
Total population 2.00 1.70 1.70 1.50
No schooling 2.33 2.00 1.75 1.50
Primary school 2.01 1.80 1.73 1.50
Middle school 1.91 1.70 1.71 1.50
College and above 1.22 1.20 1.49 1.50
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 67.61 76.54 76.54 76.54
Female 71.86 82.34 82.34 82.34
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage)
Male 95.31 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 89.95 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage)
Male 72.04 90.00 90.00 90.00
Female 61.20 85.00 85.00 85.00
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage)
Male 0.93 10.00 10.00 10.00
Female 0.69 8.00 8.00 8.00
Migration (in millions)
Total -6.31 -11.06 -11.06 -11.06
No schooling -0.67 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
Primary school -1.34 -2.35 -2.35 -2.35
Middle school -3.61 -6.33 -6.33 -6.33
College and above -0.69 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22
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Table 9. Base year parameters and central scenario assumptions for rural China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario C3
TFR
Total population 2.00 1.92 1.91 1.82
No schooling 2.33 2.33 1.91 1.82
Primary school 2.01 2.01 1.91 1.82
Middle school 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.82
College and above 1.22 1.22 1.91 1.82
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 67.61 75.68 75.68 75.68
Female 71.86 81.07 81.07 81.07
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage)
Male 95.31 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 89.95 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage)
Male 72.04 90.00 90.00 90.00
Female 61.20 75.00 75.00 75.00
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage)
Male 0.93 5.00 5.00 5.00
Female 0.69 4.00 4.00 4.00
Migration (in millions)
Total -6.31 -30.81 -30.81 -30.81
No schooling -0.67 -3.25 -3.25 -3.25
Primary school -1.34 -6.55 -6.55 -6.55
Middle school -3.61 -17.62 -17.62 -17.62
College and above -0.69 -3.39 -3.39 -3.39
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Table 10. Base year parameters and high scenario assumptions for rural China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Scenario H1 Scenario H2 Scenario H3
TFR
Total population 2.00 2.38 2.29 2.29
No schooling 2.33 2.73 2.29 2.29
Primary school 2.01 2.40 2.29 2.29
Middle school 1.91 2.33 2.29 2.29
College and above 1.22 1.66 2.29 2.29
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 67.61 74.49 74.49 74.49
Female 71.86 79.08 79.08 79.08
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage)
Male 95.31 95.31 95.31 95.31
Female 89.95 89.95 89.95 89.95
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage)
Male 72.04 72.04 72.04 72.04
Female 61.20 61.20 61.20 61.20
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage)
Male 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Female 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Migration (in millions)
Total -6.31 -50.18 -50.18 -50.18
No schooling -0.67 -5.30 -5.30 -5.30
Primary school -1.34 -10.66 -10.66 -10.66
Middle school -3.61 -28.70 -28.70 -28.70
College and above -0.69 -5.52 -5.52 -5.52
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Table 11. Base year parameters and low scenario assumptions for urban China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Scenario L1 Scenario L2 Scenario L3
TFR
Total population 1.48 1.29 1.29 1.50
No schooling 2.32 2.00 1.32 1.50
Primary school 1.92 1.70 1.31 1.50
Middle school 1.42 1.32 1.29 1.50
College and above 1.21 1.20 1.29 1.50
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 71.17 79.39 79.39 79.39
Female 76.15 84.39 84.39 84.39
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage)
Male 98.40 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 97.69 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage)
Male 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage)
Male 12.63 35.00 35.00 35.00
Female 11.34 35.00 35.00 35.00
Migration (in millions)
Total 6.31 11.07 11.07 11.07
No schooling 0.67 1.17 1.17 1.17
Primary school 1.34 2.35 2.35 2.35
Middle school 3.61 6.33 6.33 6.33
College and above 0.69 1.22 1.22 1.22
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Table 12. Base year parameters and central scenario assumptions for urban China in
2045.
Base year 1995 Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario C3
TFR
Total population 1.48 1.38 1.42 1.82
No schooling 2.32 2.32 1.42 1.82
Primary school 1.92 1.92 1.42 1.82
Middle school 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.82
College and above 1.21 1.21 1.42 1.82
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 71.17 77.90 77.90 77.90
Female 76.15 82.89 82.89 82.89
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage)
Male 98.40 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 97.69 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage)
Male 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage)
Male 12.63 25.00 25.00 25.00
Female 11.34 25.00 25.00 25.00
Migration (in millions)
Total 6.31 30.81 30.81 30.81
No schooling 0.67 3.25 3.25 3.25
Primary school 1.34 6.55 6.55 6.55
Middle school 3.61 17.62 17.62 17.62
College and above 0.69 3.39 3.39 3.39
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Table 13. Base year parameters and high scenario assumptions for urban China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Scenario H1 Scenario H2 Scenario H3
TFR
Total population 1.48 1.75 1.75 2.29
No schooling 2.32 2.72 1.75 2.29
Primary school 1.92 2.38 1.75 2.29
Middle school 1.42 1.75 1.75 2.29
College and above 1.21 1.65 1.75 2.29
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 71.17 76.10 76.10 76.10
Female 76.15 81.10 81.10 81.10
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage)
Male 98.40 98.40 98.40 98.40
Female 97.69 97.69 97.69 97.69
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage)
Male 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Female 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage)
Male 12.63 12.63 12.63 12.63
Female 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34
Migration (in millions)
Total 6.31 50.18 50.18 50.18
No schooling 0.67 5.30 5.30 5.30
Primary school 1.34 10.66 10.66 10.66
Middle school 3.61 28.70 28.70 28.70
College and above 0.69 5.52 5.52 5.52
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Table 14a. TFR under low, central, and high scenarios for all China in 2045.
Scenarios Low fertility Central fertility High fertility
Assumptions
No convergence 1.56 1.75 2.32
Education converged 1.50 1.86 2.12
Education and region
converged
1.50 1.82 2.29
Table 14b. Estimated TFR by education in 1995 for all China. Calculations are based on
Office of Population Survey (1997).
Total No schooling Primary school Middle school College and above
TFR 1.85 2.32 1.98 1.68 1.21
4 Analyses of the Projection Results
Tables 15-21 show the main results of the multi-state projection for China up to 2045.
There are nine sets of projections, in which three scenarios (low, central, and high
assumptions for fertility, mortality, migration, and education) are combined with no
convergence, education converged, and education and region converged. In addition to
the nine sets, the constant migration scenario is used to more clearly define the
differentials by education in future population development.
4.1 Population size
Based on a total population of 1.2 billion in 1995, Table 15 indicates that the Chinese
population will certainly increase. According to the low, central, and high scenarios, the
Chinese population for 2045 will be 1.37-1.38 billion (low), 1.48-1.49 billion (central),
and 1.55-1.59 billion (high). Even under the extreme scenario of low fertility, the
population is expected to grow by about 143-173 million.
Although the population will continue to increase over the next five decades, it will
grow at different speeds in different years and in rural and urban regions. In the low
scenario, population growth reaches its peak during 2020-2025. In the central scenario,
it peaks between 2030-2035, after which the population begins to show negative
growth. In the high scenario, growth will peak in 2045. The population in both rural and
urban regions will increase particularly rapidly during the next 20 to 35 years. Due to
the age structure of the population in the base year, the number of women of
reproductive age (15-49) will increase until between 2010 to 2015. The total number of
reproductive women will be around 300-350 million, according to the central and high
assumptions. The period from 1995 to 2015 is a crucial time for China’s future
population growth. However, the speed of population growth is different between rural
and urban China, since migration is an active factor in the projection. More migrants
entering the cities bring a higher increase in urban population size, as shown by all
scenarios. If we keep migration constant, as in C1 and H1 of Table 15, in central and
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high scenarios combined with no educational and regional convergence, the increased
rate of urban population size is lower than 13.94% for the central scenario, and 29.58%
for the high scenario.
Table 15. Population size (in millions) under low, central, and high scenarios in 2045.
Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
Base year Population Rate of Population Rate of Population Rate of
population increase increase increase
1995 (%) (%) (%)
No Rural 860.36 919.83 6.91 977.01 13.56 990.51 15.13
Convergence Urban 344.22 457.38 32.88 505.02 46.72 577.12 67.66
China 1204.57 1377.21 14.33 1482.03 23.03 1567.63 30.14
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
Rural 860.36 1024.62 19.09 1091.98 26.92
Urban 344.22 457.09 32.79 475.31 38.08
China 1204.57 1481.71 23.01 1567.29 30.11
Education Rural 860.36 916.70 6.55 970.58 12.81 969.42 12.68
Converged Urban 344.22 456.52 32.63 506.13 47.04 576.32 67.43
China 1204.57 1373.23 14.00 1476.71 22.59 1545.74 28.32
Education Rural 860.36 874.39 1.63 952.72 10.74 969.41 12.68
and region Urban 344.22 472.69 37.32 539.14 56.63 620.91 80.38
Converged China 1204.57 1347.08 11.83 1491.86 23.85 1590.32 32.02
4.2 Age structure
Tables 16 and 17 present the age structure under the multi-state projection. By 2045 the
proportion of the 0-14 age group in the total population will decline to about 14%-
14.8% in the low scenario, more than 16% in the central scenario, and about 19%-20%
in the high assumption, compared to 26.73% in total population in 1995. Meanwhile,
the proportion of the age group 60 and over in the total population will increase from
10.17% in 1995 to about 31% in the low scenario, about 29% in the central scenario,
and about 26% in the high scenario. This means that the proportion aged 60 and over
will double or even triple in size over the next decades. This will be a period of very
rapid aging, as a result of the baby boomers (born between the mid-1960s and early
1970s) reaching their advanced years. As a result, there will be no growth in the
working-age population after 2025 in the low scenario, and between 2030-2035 in the
central scenario. Thereafter follows a decline in the working age population.
The results of the projection show differences in the aging process in rural and urban
regions. When considering the level and speed of aging, either the proportion of elderly
or the speed of aging in urban areas is higher than in rural areas in all scenarios, while
according to the data of the base year, the proportion aged 60 and over was almost at the
same level in rural and urban regions. However, if we compare the no convergence
scenario with the education and region converged scenario, in which a convergence of
fertility around the middle school level across the different educational categories and in
rural/urban regions takes place, the increase in aging in urban regions will be slightly
slower, and the proportion of elderly will decrease more than 2%. The difference
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between rural and urban areas becomes smaller under the education and region
converged scenario.
Table 16. Population (in millions), and proportion of 0-14 age group in the total
population in 2045 (in %).
Base Year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
Population Total Population Total Population Total Population Total
No Rural 247.12 28.72 154.06 16.75 181.24 18.55 224.95 22.71
Convergence Urban 74.91 21.76 49.89 10.91 57.65 11.42 79.04 13.70
China 322.03 26.73 203.95 14.81 238.89 16.12 303.99 19.39
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
Rural 185.99 18.15 236.90 21.69
Urban 53.81 11.77 69.42 14.61
China 239.80 16.18 306.32 19.54
Education Rural 247.12 28.72 153.10 16.70 178.23 18.36 213.39 22.01
Converged Urban 74.91 21.76 49.61 10.87 58.48 11.55 78.68 13.65
China 322.03 26.73 202.71 14.76 236.71 16.03 292.07 18.90
Education Rural 247.12 28.72 130.31 14.90 167.66 17.60 213.39 22.01
And region Urban 74.91 21.76 58.56 12.39 77.67 14.41 106.42 17.14
Converged China 322.03 26.73 188.87 14.02 245.33 16.44 319.81 20.11
Table 17. Population (in millions), and proportion of ages 60 and over in the total
population in 2045 (in %).
Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
Population Total Population Total Population Total Population Total
No Rural 85.97 9.99 265.12 28.82 263.44 26.96 242.29 24.46
Convergence Urban 36.49 10.60 160.54 35.10 163.10 32.30 164.13 28.44
China 122.47 10.17 425.66 30.91 426.54 28.78 406.42 25.93
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
Rural 272.13 26.56 260.07 23.82
Urban 153.60 33.60 145.42 30.59
China 425.73 28.73 405.48 25.87
Education Rural 85.97 9.99 265.12 28.92 263.42 27.14 242.51 25.02
Converged Urban 36.49 10.60 160.54 35.16 163.10 32.22 164.13 28.48
China 122.47 10.17 425.66 31.00 426.52 28.88 406.64 26.31
Education Rural 85.97 9.99 265.12 30.32 263.62 27.67 242.52 25.02
And region Urban 36.49 10.60 160.54 33.96 163.10 30.25 164.13 26.43
Converged China 122.47 10.17 425.66 31.60 426.72 28.60 406.65 25.57
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4.3 Educational composition
Tables 18-20 provide a picture of the total population of China by educational level in
the end year of projection. The results for all scenarios show a rapid decline in the
percentage of the population with no schooling in rural and urban areas. In rural regions,
the proportion with no schooling decreases from 27.17% in 1995 to 8%-13% until 2045
in all scenarios. This change implies that China can substantially reduce the illiterate or
semi-literate population. For China as whole, the total population with no schooling will
decrease from 18.36% in the base year to between 7.5% and 11.5% in 2045.
Another important result from the multi-state projection is that the middle school
level will increase considerably over the next decades. In all scenarios, by 2045, the
percentage of urban area population attending middle schools is between 68%-71%, i.e.,
about 17%-21% higher than in the base year. As a result, in all of China, the total
population attaining a middle school education will reach 55%-66% by 2045, while it
was only 41.06% in the base year.
It is interesting to note that in the low to high scenarios, the size of both the rural and
the urban population under the education converged scenario is smaller than under the
no convergence scenario, although the assumptions for total fertility in these two
scenarios are almost same (except H3=2.29 is slightly higher than H1=2.38 in rural
regions). Even in the assumption on TFR for urban China, C2 is higher than C1, but the
size of the population is still smaller. This situation is evident when we consider fertility
differentials by educational level. In the education converged scenario, we assume
fertility converging to the middle school level across educational categories, which are
1.7, 1.91, 2.29 for rural, and 1.29, 1.42, 1.75 for urban China. The differentials of
fertility by education disappear. The size of the population under the education
converged scenario points out that slow growth is associated with a general increase in
the level of education.
32
Table 18. Population distribution (in %) by education under low, central, and high
scenarios in rural China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
No no schooling 27.17 8.80 9.81 13.42
Convergence primary school 42.72 33.28 25.64 39.44
middle school 29.87 56.53 64.00 47.09
college and above 0.25 1.39 0.55 0.05
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
no schooling 9.81 12.93
primary school 25.48 38.44
middle school 64.07 48.40
college and above 0.64 0.23
Education no schooling 27.17 8.78 9.74 12.76
converged primary school 42.72 33.31 25.63 28.64
middle school 29.87 56.53 64.06 58.51
college and above 0.25 1.38 0.57 0.09
Education no schooling 27.17 8.05 9.45 12.76
and region primary school 42.72 33.70 25.49 28.64
converged middle school 29.87 56.91 64.59 58.51
college and above 0.25 1.34 0.47 0.09
Table 19. Population distribution (in %) by education under low, central, and high
scenarios in urban China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
No no schooling 15.93 5.85 6.33 7.56
convergence primary school 26.97 11.22 11.81 12.73
middle school 50.50 70.60 69.84 70.03
college and above 6.61 12.33 12.02 9.68
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
no schooling 6.17 7.93
primary school 11.29 11.84
middle school 70.28 70.19
college and above 12.26 10.04
Education no schooling 15.90 5.84 6.40 7.55
converged primary school 26.97 11.21 11.85 12.72
middle school 50.50 70.62 69.75 70.04
college and above 6.61 12.33 12.00 9.69
Education no schooling 15.93 6.51 7.72 9.29
and region primary school 26.97 11.62 12.61 13.62
converged middle school 50.50 69.68 68.04 67.87
college and above 6.61 12.19 11.63 9.23
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Table 20. Population distribution (in %) by education under low, central, and high
scenarios for all of China in 2045.
Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
No no schooling 18.36 7.82 8.66 11.11
convergence primary school 37.96 25.95 21.06 30.17
middle school 41.06 61.21 65.94 55.29
college and above 2.62 5.02 4.35 3.44
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
no schooling 8.69 11.27
primary school 21.10 30.37
middle school 65.90 55.22
college and above 4.31 3.14
Education no schooling 18.36 7.81 8.63 10.90
converged primary school 37.96 25.96 21.04 22.96
middle school 41.06 61.20 65.96 62.63
college and above 2.62 5.03 4.37 3.51
Education no schooling 18.36 7.51 8.84 11.46
and region primary school 37.96 25.95 20.96 23.01
converged middle school 41.06 61.39 65.80 62.02
college and above 2.62 5.15 4.40 3.51
4.4 Rural-urban distribution
Table 21 presents the rural and urban population distribution in 2045, resulting from our
projection. By 2045, the proportion of total urban population will reach different levels
based on the different scenarios. When we look across all scenarios, we see two things:
1) An increase in the proportion of the urban population is largely caused by the
number of rural-to-urban migrants. The scenario is combined with greater migration
to show a higher proportion of urban population. For example, in the high scenario,
the urban proportion reaches 39%, while the low scenario shows 35%.
2) The proportion of the total urban population is influenced by fertility differentials at
the educational and regional levels. In scenarios combined with education and region
converged, in which a convergence of fertility across educational categories and in
rural/urban regions takes place, and fertility differentials by education and
rural/urban disappear, the proportion of the urban population is higher.
As mentioned previously, migration analysis is arguably the most complex
demographic variable for our population projection. In projecting the proportion of
urban population over the next decades, three important dimensions should be taken
into account.
1) The methodological measurement in the classification of rural-to-urban migration.
Our assumption for migration lies in the definition of a migrant: one who has left a
rural region of registered residence, and has lived or worked continuously for more
than one-half year in a city or town without permanent residency rights for that city
or town, but has been registered as a temporary resident. The short-term “floating”
population is excluded. The base year data on migration is relatively small.
Therefore, we believe that the proportion of total urban population over the next
decades will be higher than our assumption concludes, since a large rural migratory
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movement outside of the planned migration track will play a substantial role in the
urban economy and in the urbanization process.
2) To what degree will the central government relax the urban household registration
system, and to what extent will the government keep the policy of avoiding excessive
population concentrations in cities in the near future? The World Bank (1995) has
estimated that by 2050, the government policy of avoiding excessive population
concentrations in cities will keep the share of urban employment in China at around
50% of the total labor force. This is significantly below the 70%-80% reached in
countries such as Japan and Korea.
3) How many rural-urban migrants, including the floating population, will be absorbed
as permanent residents in cities during the economic development? The rural-to-
urban migratory movement to big cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou,
has shown that there is a need to coordinate the growth of the regional economy and
the constraint of migratory cost under market-economic conditions. On the one hand,
large cities begin to absorb selected rural-to-urban migrants as their permanent
inhabitants. On the other, most floating population do not settle down in cities, but
rather continue their urbanization process after returning to their original residence.
Table 21. Total urban population (in %) in total population in 2045.
Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario
No convergence 28.58 33.21 34.08 36.81
C1: constant migration H1: constant migration
31.00 30.00
Education converged 28.58 33.24 34.27 37.29
Education and region
converged
28.58 35.09 36.14 39.04
5 Conclusion: Population and Sustainable Development
in the Context of Policy, Education, and Economy in
China
China’s population trends have challenged the ability of the government and the land to
provide sufficient food and housing. The ongoing population change has affected
prospects for sustainable socioeconomic and environmental development. Over the next
decades, the following trends pertaining to the sustainable development of population,
economy and environment might be assumed: 1) An ever increasing population will
result in three peaks: total population, aging, and working-age population. 2) An ever
decreasing consummation of resources per capita, especially land, will result from a
large population (Yuan et al. 1997). 3) The economy will take off with a dramatic
reform of the economic structure. The GDP and GDP per capita will increase smoothly
with a stable economic structure, a slow reduction in agriculture, and a steady increase
in third industry. 4) The degradation of natural ecosystems will continue. The coming
century will support the largest number of people with the most destroyed ecosystems
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(Yuan et al. 1997). All of these trends may seriously restrain China’s prospects for
sustainable development.
When considering future population and sustainable development, Chinese scholars
and policy makers are faced with numerous questions: 1) Will the current low fertility
level be sustained, or will there be a rebound? 2) How can low fertility levels be
stabilized after fertility has reached below or near replacement level? 3) When will the
government adjust the current population policy? 4) What are the implications of very
low fertility for the economy and society? 5) How should the anticipated socioeconomic
development in coming decades be figured into the demographic trade-off between
rapid fertility decline in the near term, and rapid population aging in the long term? In
the context of global sustainable development, population is usually seen as an
important independent force, since the number of people strongly affects the demand for
food, shelter, health and infrastructure. Moreover, any sudden relaxation of the
population policy, in a country with many poor and backward rural areas, without
adequate preparation could result in a new baby boom (Zeng 1996). Therefore, China
should select a way of smoothly stabilizing the population as well as a policy for long-
term population trends.
Education will be an essential part of population and sustainable development
planning in the coming decades. It is not only the Chinese experience that fertility
decline has been interacting with education. This can clearly be seen in the results of
multi-state projections. A slow-growing population is associated with an increase in
educational attainment. Education differentials will affect the age structure as well as
the rural/urban distribution of population over the next five decades.
Fertility changes in China have frequently been categorized as “induced” and
“natural.” The rural fertility transition has been considered an induced decline and the
urban fertility transition a natural decline. A strategic policy shifting should lead to a
narrowing of the gap between the government’s goals to limit the fast growing
population and the peasantry’s demand for more children in the near future. The
mandatory education program in rural China could lower fertility. This calls for a
successful switch of focus of the Chinese family planning programs from executive
methods to an “integrated approach” which involves enhancement of education, better
status for women, and social welfare.
A rapid increase in aging and fast growing rural-to-urban migration will co-exist in
China in the future. The results of the multi-state projection show that an increase in the
proportion of urban population is largely caused by the extent of rural-to-urban
migration. Both the proportion of elderly and the speed of aging in urban areas is higher
than in rural areas. Thus, from the perspective of securing a more favorable ratio of
working-age persons to retirement-age persons, more rural-to-urban migration might
contribute to a smoother change in the population age structure in the cities.
According to the results of our projection, the future educational composition of the
population will increase considerably in the middle school level over the next decades.
This will be a significant benefit to sustainable population, socioeconomic, and
environmental development. The changing of the educational composition of the
population will coincide with the changing of the economic structure, with a slow
reduction in agriculture and a steady increase in the service sector. In this sense, the
combination of education and population projections significantly contributes to
understanding sustainable development options for China.
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